

# Defining States of the World

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# States of the World

- In the **Savagean** (after Leonard Savage) framework for decision-making under uncertainty, the first step is the identification of **all relevant sources of uncertainty** for the problem one is considering.
- Next, we define a **state of the world** as a possible outcome of the **resolution of all those uncertainties**.
- The same definition is applied in problems of **general equilibrium under uncertainty**, in which one defines **contingent plans** (or contingent commodities) by using the states of the world as an **indexing variable** for the different goods, much in the same way as one indexes goods by time or location.

## The “Monty Hall” example

- A **contestant** tries to choose a prize that has been placed behind **one of three doors, A, B, and C**, with equal probabilities.
- Initially, the contestant chooses one of the doors.
- Out of the two remaining doors, the **host** (Monty Hall) will open one that does not have the prize behind.
- Next, the contestant is asked whether she prefers to **stick with her original choice or switch** to the remaining door.

## Usual reactions

- Let's suppose that the contestant originally chooses door  $A$ , and then the host opens door  $C$ .
- There are two ways of reasoning about this problem:
  - ① The **apparently naïve** way: “My initial probabilities were  $1/3$  for  $A$  and  $2/3$  for  $\{B, C\}$ . Therefore, after  $C$  is opened my probabilities are  $1/3$  for  $A$  and  $2/3$  for  $B$ .”
  - ② The **apparently sophisticated** way: “Given that my initial estimates are that  $A$  and  $B$  have equal probability, after  $C$  is opened I have no reason to modify their relative weights, so the conditional probabilities of  $A$  and  $B$  must still be equal, ie  $1/2$  each.”
- Given that economists tend to view themselves as sophisticated thinkers, most of them adhere to the second alternative on a first reaction.

## Conditional probabilities and information

- One way to formally solve the dilemma consists of computing the **conditional probabilities** of  $A$  and  $B$ , given the information that has been received.
- The problem with the wrong way of reasoning (which is the apparently sophisticated one) is that **the information received is misrepresented**.
- If we interpret that the information received is “**the prize is not behind door  $C$ ,**” then the apparently sophisticated interpretation is right. For instance:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Prob}(A|\text{Not } C) &= \text{Prob}(A|\{A, B\}) = \frac{\text{Prob}(A \& \{A, B\})}{\text{Prob}(\{A, B\})} = \\ &= \frac{\text{Prob}(A)}{\text{Prob}(\{A, B\})} = \frac{1/3}{2/3} = \frac{1}{2}\end{aligned}$$

## What exactly is the information received?

- However, the information received is **not exactly** that the prize is not behind door *C*.
- This would be the right way to represent the information if, **before the contestant takes any decision**, the host opens door *C* and shows that there is no prize behind.
- But here the host has opened door *C* **after the contestant chose door *A***.
- This subtle distinction makes a **huge difference** regarding the computation of the conditional probabilities.

## Resorting to states of the world

- A **systematic approach** in order to compute the right conditional probabilities is based on defining the states of the world for this problem.
- There are **four sources of uncertainty**: Where the prize is, and which door the host will open for each of the 3 possible initial choices of the contestant.
- So the state space has **4 dimensions**.

## Defining the states of the world

- The **first dimension** represents the **location of the prize**, and therefore it has 3 possibilities (*A*, *B*, or *C*).
- The **second dimension** represents the **door the host will open if the contestant initially chooses door *A***, and therefore there are two possibilities (open *B* or *C*).
- Analogously, the **third and four dimensions** represent the door that the host will open whenever the initial choice of the contestant is, respectively, *B* or *C*.
- This makes a total of **24 possible states**.



## Description of the states of the world

- However, some of those 24 possible states have **probability zero**, given the rules of the game.
- These are those states in which the prize is behind a certain door and then the host opens this door: **this can never happen**.
- Taking this fact into account, we are left with just **6 states that have positive probability**.
- If  $D$  represents one of the doors ( $A$ ,  $B$ , or  $C$ ), then let us denote with  $pD$  the location of the prize, and with  $oD$  the door that the host opens.
- Then the states that have positive probability are:

$(pA, oB, oC, oB)$      $(pA, oC, oC, oB)$

$(pB, oC, oA, oA)$      $(pB, oC, oC, oA)$

$(pC, oB, oA, oA)$      $(pC, oB, oA, oB)$

## Assigning probabilities


- Thus, for example,  $(p_A, o_B, o_C, o_B)$  means that the prize is behind door  $A$ , and the host will open  $B$  if  $A$  is initially chosen,  $C$  if  $B$  is initially chosen, and  $B$  if  $C$  is initially chosen.
- The **assignment of probabilities** depends on what the contestant estimates the strategy of the host will be.
- Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that **the host will choose with equal probabilities** whenever he has a choice of opening two doors, and these choices are **independent** among themselves and also independent of where the prize is.

## Probabilities of the states


- ☞ With this assumption, the **probabilities of the different states** are **multiplicative**:

State	Probability
$(pA, oB, oC, oB)$	$\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{2} \times 1 \times 1 = \frac{1}{6}$
$(pA, oC, oC, oB)$	$\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{2} \times 1 \times 1 = \frac{1}{6}$
$(pB, oC, oA, oA)$	$\frac{1}{3} \times 1 \times \frac{1}{2} \times 1 = \frac{1}{6}$
$(pB, oC, oC, oA)$	$\frac{1}{3} \times 1 \times \frac{1}{2} \times 1 = \frac{1}{6}$
$(pC, oB, oA, oA)$	$\frac{1}{3} \times 1 \times 1 \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{6}$
$(pC, oB, oA, oB)$	$\frac{1}{3} \times 1 \times 1 \times \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{6}$

## Conditional probabilities

-  **Probability of win if staying put:** The conditional probability of the prize being behind A whenever the contestant has chosen A initially and the host has opened B is:

$$\frac{\text{Prob}(pA, oB, oC, oB)}{\text{Prob}(pA, oB, oC, oB) + \text{Prob}(pC, oB, oA, oA) + \text{Prob}(pC, oB, oA, oB)} = \frac{1/6}{(1/6) + (1/6) + (1/6)} = \frac{1}{3}$$

-  **Probability of win if switching:** The conditional probability of the prize being behind C whenever the contestant has chosen A initially and the host has opened B is:

$$\frac{\text{Prob}(pC, oB, oA, oA) + \text{Prob}(pC, oB, oA, oB)}{\text{Prob}(pA, oB, oC, oB) + \text{Prob}(pC, oB, oA, oA) + \text{Prob}(pC, oB, oA, oB)} = \frac{(1/6) + (1/6)}{(1/6) + (1/6) + (1/6)} = \frac{2}{3}$$

## Conclusion

- Therefore, whenever the contestant chooses initially  $A$  and the host opens  $B$ , the contestant should decide to switch to  $C$ .
- It is easy to see that, in all cases, switching to the remaining door will give a probability of winning equal to  $2/3$ , while staying put will have an attached probability of  $1/3$ .
- Actually, **the apparently naïve reasoning we described before is right.**

## A different way of getting the right answer

- There is a very simple way of reasoning to obtain the right answer.
- Think in **frequentist terms**, assuming that the **law of large numbers** holds exactly.
- Suppose that the game is repeated 300 times, and that the prize is behind each door exactly 100 times.
- Then, if the contestant initially chooses *A* and next switches to the remaining door, she will win in the 200 cases in which the prize is either behind *B* or behind *C*, while maintaining the choice of *A* will only win in 100 cases.
- That is, the apparently naïve way of reasoning is right.